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In his 1930 essay on the Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren, John 
Maynard Keynes forecasted that growth and technological change would allow 
mankind to solve the economic problem within a century. He expected the standards 
of living in “progressive countries” to raise between four and eight fold in the coming 
century. Meanwhile, work time would fall to a fifteen-hour week, bringing about 
major cultural and ethical changes: The new society would “honour those who can 
teach us how to pluck the hour and the day virtuously and well, and those who are 
capable of taking direct enjoyment in things”. 
If a region of the world has come close to fulfill Keynes’ prophecy, it is continental 
Western Europe.1
The change in the European living standards since 1950 is indeed stunning. 
Continental Europe was immensely poorer back then. With the exception of 
Switzerland, GDP per capita in the old continent ranged between 4,000 and 6,000 US 
Dollars, which is comparable – in the upper bound – to China today and is only 
slightly above – in the lower bound – than Pakistan today. The frontier economies of 
the time, especially the US, enjoyed a GDP per capita which was about twice as large 
as that of Western Europe. Over such a long horizon, the economies of continental 
Europe have cut their distance to the technological frontier substantially. For instance, 
in 2008, the GDP per capita of the US was 40 % higher than the average in the 
European Union. Fast convergence has also meant a high absolute growth compared 
 Restricting attention to the period for which systematic data are 
available, GDP per capita grew by a four fold between 1950 and 2000 worldwide. 
During this period, continental Europe was a strong performer among industrialized 
countries: The growth of GDP per capita ranged from a 4.2-fold increase in France to 
a 6.7-fold increase in Spain. In comparison, GDP per capita increased by a 3.2-fold in 
the US and in the UK. Work time has fallen in Western Europe more rapidly than 
anywhere else in the world. 
                                                          
1 I shall refer to continental Europe as of the Western European countries that were under the political 
influence of the United States after World War II, including countries such as Austria, Finland, Sweden 
and Switzerland that were formally neutral. Due to their different institutional development, my 
definition excludes the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. 
with previous times: the annual growth in Western Europe over the last 50 years has 
been about three times as large as in the years from 1820 to 1950. 
Despite the favorable long-run economic performance of continental Europe, the US 
economy has often been portrayed as the success story. Plenty of newspaper articles, 
political speeches, and academic research have described the old continent as the sick 
man: a sclerotic under-achiever, a slow-growing, work-shy and ageing continent that 
is destined to be left behind the dynamic economy of the United States, and also to be 
overcome by the new giants, China and India, in the long run. The causes are 
commonly identified in tax distortions, low competition, excess regulation and state 
intervention, overly generous welfare state systems, rigid labor market institutions, 
and a system of values overemphasizing leisure and low risk taking. 
Economists have a natural tendency to overreact to the most recent events and 
attribute the status of irreversible changes to short-run trends. Perhaps for this reason, 
the pessimistic portray of Europe is heavily shaped by the economic slowdown 
experienced by continental Europe in the last quarter of century. Earlier on, European 
institutions had been extremely successful in promoting a rapid catch up with the US. 
Thereafter, convergence died off, and was followed by a stark reversal of fortunes 
during the Nineties, when the annual GDP growth of the initial six members of the 
EU remained more than a percentage point lower than that of the US. The relative 
weakness of Europe’s recent economic performance has been reflected in the data on 
investment share of GDP: While the investment share of the EU outperformed that of 
the US by more than 10 percentage points in the Sixties, this lead has been 
progressively eroded, and in recent years the US has even surpassed some European 
economies in this respect. 
Arguably, the most patent crisis of Europe manifested itself in the labor market. 
Unemployment had been a minor issue up until the early Seventies: With the 
exception of Italy, not a single continental European country experienced an average 
unemployment rate above 2.7 % from 1965 to 1972; in small economies it stayed well 
below 2 %; in Switzerland, unemployment was practically unknown, and the thriving 
confederation attracted a large number of foreign workers. During the same years, the 
US had an average 4.3 % unemployed rate, and a much more pronounced 
employment volatility over the business cycle than Europe. However, during the 
turbulence of the Seventies, unemployment grew rapidly all over continental Europe, 
well in excess of what happened in the US. In the last twenty years, the 
unemployment rate stabilized around 10 % in Europe, almost twice as high as in the 
US.2
What explanation can modern economics offer to the downturn in continental 
Europe’s economic performance? Economists strive to identify the policies and 
institutional roots of successful performance. However, the main focus of economic 
research changes over time: The traditional neoclassical theory of economic growth 
emphasized the role of physical and human capital accumulation. New growth 
theories developed since the 1990s shifted the focus on to institutions, technological 
progress and innovation. Although these theories were originally designed to study 
growth in the leading edge of world technology, their predictions and prescriptions 
have been quickly, and sometimes mechanically, extrapolated to the process of 
technological convergence of countries that are behind the frontier. This exercise has 
led many economists to conclude that there are “good” and “bad” institutions, 
independent of the development stage of a nation. Moreover, good institutions lead to 
good policies, consisting of reforms removing market and government frictions, 
enforcing property rights, ensuring macroeconomic stability, flexible labor markets, 
and sound educational policies. In summary, the mainstream view is that European 
growth has been harmed by bad policies and poor institutions. 
 
As I argued in recent research, I do not find this approach fruitful. Economic 
development is far less a linear process than mainstream growth theory portrays it. 
Continental Europe is a clear example. Until the mid-seventies, the economic 
performance of continental Europe was very strong. Where did all that growth come 
from? One may suspect that the good start would reflect mechanically the 
reconstruction that took place after the devastations of the Second World War. This 
explanation would be hard to reconcile with the observation of other similar episodes. 
For example, World War I caused a much more severe physical devastation in 
Western Europe (especially in Britain and France) than did World War II. Yet, the 
two decades after World War I were characterized by low and unstable growth. 
Moreover, as I will argue below, mere reconstruction was more or less finished as 
early as 1951. 
                                                          
2 The recent crisis is rapidly changing the current picture. In February 2009, the unemployment rate has 
reached 8.5 % both in the US and in the Euro area. 
The good-vs.-bad institutions paradigm is obviously too stark: We need a richer 
theoretical framework in order to understand these facts more plausibly. In 
Acemoglu/Aghion/Zilibotti (2006) and Zilibotti (2008) we propose to replace the 
dichotomy between good and bad institutions with one between appropriate and 
inappropriate institutions. Our theory can explicitly account for both the strong 
performance of European economies up until the Seventies and its subsequent 
slowdown. Stated in a nutshell, we argue that the success of different policies and 
institutions depends on the stage of technological development. In other words, 
whether certain local institutions provide an environment that fosters or harms 
economic growth may depend on the distance to the technological frontier. At the end 
of the Second World War, many continental European economies lagged significantly 
behind the technological level of the US. Under these circumstances, unorthodox 
policies including anti-competitive practices and social policies strengthening internal 
cohesion and team working can promote growth and technological convergence. 
Continental Europe may be a case of successful implementation of unorthodox 
policies. 
With this theoretical framework in mind, I will take a closer look at the key 
institutional factors that characterized Western Europe during the third quarter of the 
Twentieth Century. I will borrow some figures from the excellent recent work of 
Eichengreen (2006). The first factor was the Marshall Plan. From 1947 to 1951, about 
13 billion US Dollars were disbursed to help the recovery of the Western European 
economies that had suffered war damages. Only two years after the Marshall Plan had 
been put into effect, all Western European countries except Germany produced 
already more than in 1938. In 1951, the fourth and last year of the Marshall Plan, 
production exceeded the pre-war level by 35 %. The poverty and starvation of the 
immediate postwar years quickly disappeared. Apparently, the Marshall Plan was a 
success and had a major impact on postwar reconstruction. However, it is unlikely to 
have been sufficient to sustain a prolonged period of income and productivity growth. 
The second key institutional factor was policies targeted at fostering social cohesion. 
This spirit of national cooperation prevailed across ideological lines. On the one hand, 
pro-US governments and business leaderships were wary of social confrontation. The 
memory of the events that followed World War I, with the success of the Russian 
Revolution and anti-capitalistic movements being barely contained in Germany, Italy, 
Hungary and Finland, was too fresh for the Western political leaderships to take risks 
at the onset of the cold war. On the other hand, socialist and even some communist 
parties (in France and Italy) perceived to have a stake in the postwar democracies and 
ended up agreeing, first tactically but eventually strategically, on the basic 
fundamentals of liberal democracy. The participation of the labor movement was 
aided by a large number of social concessions, for instance, unemployment benefits 
and national pension systems were developed. In exchange, employers got a 
significant wage restraint, and, to a varying extent, cooperative industrial relations. 
Social cohesion was exemplified in Sweden by the so-called “Saltsjöbaden spirit”, 
after the Saltsjöbaden agreements which laid down rules on collective bargaining, 
industrial action, disputes threatening the public interest, and termination of the 
employment contract. Although the original deal stretches back to 1938, its effects 
accrued mainly after the war period. Then, it became an accepted framework to base 
industrial relationships on cooperation, mutual respect, and commitment to reach 
peaceful solutions based on compromise and to cultivate a sense of responsibility for 
the aggregate effects of labor market policy. 
Low wage growth was not the mere effect of political pressure and institutional 
arrangements. Equally important were some structural factors, in particular the 
abundance of labor and the enormous inequality across European regions, some of 
which were still predominantly agricultural.3 This situation produced a large 
immigration flow into more prosperous and industrialized countries such as Germany 
and Switzerland. The abundance of labor originating from the decline of employment 
in the agricultural sector kept wage pressure low, and fostered investments and capital 
accumulation. Thus, structural change was an important source of economic growth, 
as it is today in the ongoing rapid industrialization of China.4
Another important factor was industrial policy. The economic literature of the last 
thirty years has emphasized – sometimes obsessively – the importance of government 
failures in the process of development. The orthodox doctrine maintains that 
governments should limit their role to create conditions that are favorable to private 
investments, and not become involved directly in the investment process. Policies 
identifying “strategic sectors” and pursuing the growth of some industries through 
discriminatory instruments (e.g., barriers to competitions, subsidies to specific firms 
 
                                                          
3 See Kindleberger (1967). 
4 See Song/Storesletten/Zilibotti (2009). 
and industries) are often portrayed as examples of bad policies. Yet, unorthodox 
industrial policies were common fare in the golden age of Western Europe, as well as 
in the take-off of Korea and Japan. 
Though each country handled this subject their own way and to varying extents, there 
is a general pattern of state getting involved to coordinate investments and the 
development of strategic activities. In France and Italy, the restoration of market 
economy was accompanied by a particularly strong role of governments, even with 
elements of planning. The French Planning Commissariat created in 1946 and headed 
by Jean Monnet aimed at overcoming coordination problems, made acute by the 
underdevelopment of capital markets and by severe informational constraints. The 
Planning Commissariat invested heavily in basic industrial sectors, like coal, steel or 
cement, and provided subsidies and concessionary loans. Estrin and Holmes (1983) 
document how this industrial policy had a large impact on the French economy. In 
Italy, an interventionist industrial policy also prevailed. The state-owned holding 
company Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI) and its offspring enterprises 
took over a coordinating role in the economy.5 IRI-controlled firms benefited from 
selective preferential credit from specialized state-controlled bank institutions which 
accounted for 20 % of all industrial investment in 1950.6
Relative to France and Italy, direct state intervention was less important in Germany, 
partly in reaction against the interventionism of the Nazi period. There, the emphasis 
was rather on “values”, such as thrift, hard work, moral and physical reconstruction 
after the defeat. The development of institutions fostering social cooperation was 
important in Germany: collective bargaining between employers’ organizations and 
national trade unions, as well as the limited use of industrial action (relative, e.g., to 
Britain) created a framework resembling the Saltsjöbaden spirit in Sweden. 
 State holding companies and 
industrial policy could address a variety of coordination problems, including the 
synergies between investments in public infrastructure and in industrial activities. 
The extent to which labor markets should be centralized and organized around the 
coordinating role of unions and employer associations is a controversial topic in 
economics. There are two opposite effects: one the one hand, centralized bargaining 
can be beneficial, as it guarantees that wage setters recognize the general equilibrium 
                                                          
5 See Toninelli (2000). 
6 See Eichengreen (2006). 
impact of their actions. Specifically, centralized trade unions recognize that wage 
growth feeds inflation and therefore refrain from excessive wage demands. On the 
other hand, centralized bargaining may grant a disproportionate power to unions 
which can translate in high growth of real wages. Calmfors and Driffill (1988) 
document a U-shaped relationship between economic performance and centralization 
of labor markets, in the sense that both centralized and decentralized systems are 
better than an intermediate system. Highly centralized systems like Sweden or Austria 
as well as decentralized systems as Canada or the US were described by their study as 
success stories.7
The golden age of growth in continental Europe was by-and-large an investment-
driven phenomenon, with capital accumulating at a rate of 4-8 % per year in the first 
two decades after the war. However, high investments were also accompanied by 
significant technological convergence: total factor productivity, a measure of 
technological progress, grew at an annual 3 %, well above the US and the UK. Trade 
integration was an important driving force of investment and technological change. 
New European institutions developed in the Fifties, particularly the European Coal 
and Steel Community and the European Economic Community, favored intra-regional 
trade and growing trust and cooperation between European countries. Trade 
integration was helped by macroeconomic and price stability. The boom spilled over 
to countries that were not part of the European Community, such as Spain, Portugal 
and Greece that grew over 7 % per year in per capita terms. 
 
The subsequent crisis was anticipated by a breakdown of social cohesion towards the 
end of the Sixties. Increasing wage pressure, political radicalism threatening the 
traditional organizations of the working class, the end of macroeconomic stability, 
and the first oil shock in 1973 were the key factors. The subsequent period is 
described by many economists as one of mounting rigidities. During the Seventies, 
governments tried in vain to prevent a fall in investments by adopting expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policies. At the same time, they increased the size and the scope 
of welfare state institutions in order to protect the affected groups. This led to higher 
                                                          
7 More recent studies find that the U-shaped relationship weakened in more recent years. Forni (2004) 
argues that the benefits of centralization increase when the employment share in the public sector is 
large. 
taxes and increasingly rigid labor markets. Lindbeck (1995) writes of hazardous 
welfare state dynamics and of a welfare overshoot. 
Equally important was the worldwide deceleration of growth in the mid-Seventies. 
The propelling force of technological change in traditional industrial sectors ceased, 
leading to a slowdown of productivity growth. While the world was at the dawn of a 
new technological revolution, its effects on productivity were still limited. Greenwood 
and Yorukoglu (1997) describe the year 1974 as a watershed. The change was global 
in nature, and did not only mark Europe. Indeed, growth in continental Europe 
remained above the US and UK throughout the Seventies, but the convergence rate 
fell. The reversal started in the 1980s: for the first time, the US and the UK grew 
faster than the six members of the European Economic Community. Meanwhile, most 
continental European countries experienced soaring unemployment, arguably due to 
the macroeconomic adjustment policies introduced to curb inflation. A cultural 
change nurtured a growing social acceptance of welfare dependence.8
Another important new development was the rise of income inequality. The nature of 
technical progress – and in particular the IT revolution – favored highly educated 
workers while affecting adversely the less educated ones.
 
9 The rise in inequality was 
not offset by policy in the US and the UK. Continental European societies were both 
imbued with different values and subject to more politically organized lower classes. 
The result was that European countries were less prepared to accept a large increasing 
in inequality, and more inclined to use policies (even costly ones) to offset the new 
trends. Thus, the European response was to strengthen the safety nets. However, this 
resulted in higher unemployment, especially among low-skill and young workers.10
In the wake of economic downturn, “reform” became the new buzzword in many 
European countries. The economic crisis did trigger reforms in some countries, albeit 
in various shapes and varying success, reaching from the Thatcher government’s 
reduction of trade union power in 1979, to tax and pension system reforms in many 
 In 
addition, continental Europe lagged behind in the introduction of new technologies. 
As a result, during the 1990s, growth accelerated significantly in the US, while it fell 
in Europe, especially in France, Germany and Italy. 
                                                          
8 A number of recent papers discuss the change in culture and norms in response to incentives. See, 
e.g., Hassler et al. (2005), Lindbeck/Nyberg (2006), and Doepke/Zilibotti (2005 and 2008). 
9 See Acemoglu (1998). 
10 See Marimon/Zilibotti (2000). 
Scandinavian countries in the early Nineties. The path of reforms was more troubled 
in Germany and France. In Italy, populism raged and thaumaturgic remedies to avert 
economic crisis were promised again and again without governments undertaking any 
significant action to try to restore growth. 
Two models emerged among the countries that embraced reforms. On the one hand, 
Britain engaged in deunionization, lower taxes and weak safety nets. On the other 
hand, Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands pursued the avenue of flexicurity. 
This neologism describes institutions in which workers are protected, but jobs are not. 
Compared with other European countries, firm can dismiss worker relatively easily, 
but in case that happens, workers can count on robust safety nets. Retraining and 
further education are emphasized to facilitate re-entry into the labor market. The 
viability of insurance systems is guaranteed by a set of incentive-compatible rules. 
Active promotion of labor participation is another important feature of the model, for 
instance by providing generous state-subsidies to daycare arrangements. Strong safety 
nets come at a cost: They require higher taxes than in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
The performance of flexicurity came under the spotlight recently. Consider the Nordic 
experience as of the mid-Nineties: From 1993 to 2004, Nordic countries grew at an 
annual 2.6 % rate in per worker terms. In the same period, the US grew at 2.1 %, and 
Italy and Germany trailed at 1.5 %. In Nordic countries, unemployment fell and labor 
participation rose over time. Interestingly, flexicurity is not a reformed social-
democratic recipe. The Nordic experience has common traits over a period during 
which Sweden was led by a socialist government, Denmark by non-socialist 
governments, Finland by a coalition government and Norway by a sequence of 
governments of different ideologies. 
With these historical observations in mind, I would like to return to the dichotomy 
between appropriate and inappropriate institutions. As mentioned earlier, the crucial 
point is that the distance to the technological frontier determines how different 
institutions fare in fostering or hindering economic growth. The theory relies on the 
fact that technical progress can stem either from imitation or innovation. Imitation 
means the adoption of existing technologies while innovation stands for the discovery 
or local adaptation of new technologies. Imitation and investment-led growth prevail 
at earlier stages. However, as technological convergence progresses, innovation 
becomes relatively more important for growth. Innovation requires human capital and 
the “selection” of the best firms and entrepreneurs. 
Therefore, far from frontier, rigid institutions including selective industrial policy, 
governments’ ownership of infrastructure and banks and regulated labor markets can 
help overcoming constraints on investments. But over time, both optimal and 
equilibrium arrangements tend to change endogenously. In other words, economic 
development in early stages is fostered by rigid institutions, while in later stages 
flexible institutions provide a better environment for economic growth. In this theory, 
the speed of change does not have to be efficient. It is plausible that economies that 
fail to change and reform institutions into a flexible direction slow down and their 
process of technological convergence may come to a halt. 
The theory has been tested successfully on cross-country data.11
The Italian economist Francesco Giavazzi captured this pattern nicely in an article on 
the Italian newspaper Corriere della Serra. He wrote: “The idea that the economy 
needs institutions in which State and large banks cooperate under the government’s 
direction was innovative in the 1930s and in the post-war period, when Italy was a 
poor and backward country […]. In the 1950s and 1960s Italy – as later Japan and 
South Korea – has grown by adopting well-established technologies, most of them 
developed in the US: steel, automobile, household appliance industries. In that stage 
[...] one needed stability, and hence long-term relationships between industry and 
banks, stable ownership structures, low managerial turnover [...]. A strong role of the 
State in the economy was no obstacle: much of the growth in the 1960s is due to IRI 
which controlled a good share of the Italian industry and several major banks, and 
which has produced a generation of outstanding managers. But when a country 
reaches the technology frontier, innovation becomes the key factor for growth. And 
since it is mainly new firms that innovate, one needs a lot of “creative destruction”, 
 It turns out that 
barriers to competition, a common feature of rigid institutions, affect economic 
growth in a non-linear way. Far from the frontier, they can be an appropriate policy to 
provide growth, but when the economy approaches the technological frontier, this 
policy becomes inappropriate. This is exactly what the theory predicts. For example, 
this pattern is observable in the economic development of South Korea, Japan, France 
or Italy, which all grew rapidly thanks to rigid institutions until they reached the stage 
where more flexible institutions became appropriate. 
                                                          
11 See Zilibotti (2008a). 
namely, an environment in which old firms close down and are replaced by new ones, 
whose ownership is contestable, even that of banks”. 
Before concluding, I would like to come back to another main theme of Keynes’ 1930 
essay that I have ignored so far, i.e., the secular reduction in working time. I will 
argue that this has important consequences over the comparative analysis of the 
economic performance of Europe and the US in the last quarter of century. Keynes 
forecasted that work time would fall to fifteen hours per week. Quantitatively, the 
prophecy was inaccurate, as to date the working week is at least twice as long 
practically anywhere in the world. Nor can we reasonably expect swift changes in the 
near future. Keynes wrote his essay under the impression made by a strong trend 
towards the reduction of the work time before his time. The average annual number of 
hours worked per worker fell by almost 30 % between 1870 and 1930, in both Europe 
and the US.12
However, the trend towards work time reduction continued well beyond Keynes. As 
late as in 1967, Herman Kahn (1967) echoed Keynes’ forecast and wrote that by year 
2000 Americans would enjoy three months of vacation per year and a four-day 
workweek. He turned out to be wrong. Today, Americans work about as many hours 
each year as they did in 1970. It appears as if 1974 happened to be a watershed in 
another dimension: the US experienced a trend break in the increasing demand of 
leisure, while nothing comparable happened in Western Europe. In 1974, Britons, 
Germans and Frenchmen worked on average 5-10 % more than Americans. At the 
turn of the century, however, they only worked 70-75 % of their American 
counterparts.
 The sharpest drop actually occurred in the three first decades of the 
Twentieth Century.  
13
                                                          
12 See Zilibotti (2008b). 
 If one factors in the number of hours, the performance of Europe in 
terms of productivity is no longer dismal: In terms of productivity the difference 
between the US and continental Europe is tiny. But since more people work in 
America, and since each working person works more hours, Americans create more 
income through the market. In effect, Americans create more wealth, while Europeans 
enjoy more leisure. In other words, while the GDP per capita has grown faster in the 
US than in Europe, the opposite is true when one looks at output per hour worked.  
13 See Zilibotti (2008b). 
What can explain the contrasting labor supply behaviour? According to Prescott 
(2004), the key is the distortionary effects of high European labor income tax: Taxes 
increased in Europe since the 1970s progressively discouraging labor supply. 
Marimon and Zilibotti (2000) explored a different explanation. As discussed above, 
Europe responded to the crisis of the 1970s and the pressure towards more inequality 
by tightening labor market regulation. In some countries, the reduction in working 
hours became part of the package. For instance, in France a first legislation was 
enacted in the Eighties to increase mandatory vacation time and to restrict the use of 
overtime. Then, in 2000, the statutory working week was reduced from 39 to 35 hours 
for all companies employing over 20 people (Aubry Law). Both of the above theories 
identify distortionary European policies as the culprit. But there might be a less 
pessimistic lesson: Europeans may be choosing a more balanced allocation of the 
productivity gains between increasing income and leisure. Whether as a matter of 
taste or as the effect of policies (that are in any case the outcome of democratic 
processes), Europeans seem to be moving closer to Keynes’ humanism. Whether any 
further movement in this direction is feasible in the close future is unclear, especially 
as long as the demographic trend brings about a growing proportion of retirees in the 
population, and work time reductions in the active population may jeopardize the 
sustainability of the pension system. Two issues are in any case worth noting: first, we 
should not forget that Europeans have simply continued to follow the secular trend 
towards an increasing consumption of leisure. It is Americans who seem to have 
decided that they had enough leisure and that any further productivity gain should be 
dollarized. Second, the environmental sustainability of economic growth is an issue of 
increasing importance. Among the various forms in which human kind can enjoy the 
fruit of technical progress, leisure has the virtue of being most environmental friendly. 
Taking stock of the previous discussion, the picture of Europe as a sick man 
condemned to perpetual decline is inaccurate, and has partly been fed by the 
ideological excesses of the recent years. The declining relative performance of large 
continental European economies during the last three decades is worrisome, although 
its impression may have been exaggerated by the intercontinental differences in labor 
supply dynamics. It is an open question whether the European model, which led to 
such a successful development up to the seventies, may appeal to developing 
countries. So far, both India and China have been looking at the US with much more 
attention than at Europe. But this perception may be changing rapidly. The current 
crisis suggests that economies providing no safety nets pay very high prices when a 
downturn occurs, and the myth of the “Great Moderation” (i.e., that economic 
fluctuations are no longer a feature of post-modern economies) has suffered a lethal 
blow. Skepticism has also grown to the ideology that markets can function without 
rules. In this changing context, it is possible that European institutions will meet 
renewed attention. 
While this recalibration may be salubrious for both the intellectual and political 
debate, it should not turn Europeans self-indulgent. A defensive attitude over obsolete 
or unsustainable policies may hinder the possibility of resuming high growth under 
new premises. It will take renewed social cohesion to implement necessary reforms, 
be it concerning pension systems, dismissal laws or barriers to entry, to achieve either 
more consumption or more leisure. It is clear that assessments of Europe will continue 
to cause controversy: Some might speak of “lazy Europe”, others of “too high taxes”, 
and again others might recognize a “forward-looking attitude towards resource 
sustainability” in the economic path Europe will go. 
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